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Abstract
We analyse Nash equilibrium in time of use of a congested facility. Users
are risk averse with general concave utility. Queues are subject to varying
degrees of random sorting, ranging from strict queue priority to a completely
random queue. We dene the key "no residual queue" property, which holds
when there is no queue at the time the last user arrives at the queue, and
prove that this property holds in equilibrium under all queueing regimes con-
sidered. The no residual queue property leads to simple results concerning
the equilibrium utility of users and the timing of the queue.
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1 Introduction
Queueing phenomena are ubiquitous. There are queues in supermarkets, banks,
public ofces, restaurants [5], movie theatres, concert ticket sales, at ski lifts
[4] and toll road booths, in airports [7], computer systems, communications sys-
tems, web services, call centers, and numerous other systems. Especially conges-
tion during the commuting journey has been studied extensively [17]. Enormous
amounts of time are lost queueing. Just for private transportation, the cost of con-
gestion in Europe and the US has been estimated to be equivalent to more than 1
percent of GDP [11, 18]. Unpriced congestion is a cause of excess urban sprawl
[3].
Queues can be served under different queueing regimes [15, 9]. A useful
benchmark is the rst-in-rst-out (FIFO) queue discipline, where users are served
in the sequence of their arrival to the queue. Many real queues, however, involve
an element of random sorting, so that queue priority is only partly maintained.
For example, while FIFO applies to individual checkout lines in the supermarket,
FIFO does not apply to the supermarket checkout system as a whole, when there
is more than one line, since one user could arrive at the checkout later than another
user and still be served before him [6]. Queues can also have random possibilities
for overtaking; for example when a new checkout line opens in the supermarket.
Queueing for public transport is another case where queueing discipline is often
not strictly FIFO [20]. In general, we may think that FIFO is an idealisation and
that strict FIFO rarely occurs. It is thus of interest to determine the properties of
queues that are not strictly FIFO.
A polar case to the FIFO queue is the pure random queue, i.e. a queue with
no priority.1 In this case, every person present in the queue at a given time has
the same probability of being served as any other person in the queue. This corre-
sponds, e.g., to a (virtual) queue to get through on a busy telephone line. Having
been trying to place a call for a longer time does not increase the likelihood of
being able to have access to the line [8].
The general practice in the operations research literature is to consider the
arrival rate as exogenous, perhaps allowing the user to balk when meeting a long
queue [14, 12]. In contrast, we consider a framework where the arrival rate into
the queue is endogenous. In other words, the time of use is a decision variable of
the user. For simplicity, we consider only the case where total usage is constant 
the extension to endogenous total demand is straightforward.
The economic literature has previously paid attention to the properties of user
equilibrium in queues with strict queue priority using the deterministic bottleneck
1It is also possible to conceive of queues with a queue manager. In this case, a last-in-rst-out
queue may be considered an opposite of a FIFO queue [10].
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model of Vickrey [19]. In his seminal framework, the arrival pattern depends on
the evolution of the queue. Individuals are assumed to choose their time of arrival
into the queue to minimise a weighted sum of the time spent in the queue, and
linear penalties associated with being early or late at the destination. We extend
Vickrey's model in two ways: by allowing for more general preference structures
and by allowing for stochastic rather than deterministic service time. Individual
risk aversion matters when service time is stochastic. Assuming a continuum of
users, we are able to characterise the equilibrium arrival rate into the queue as well
as the equilibrium user utility and the equilibrium time interval of arrivals.
The classic Vickrey bottleneck model offers many insights that are central to
the understanding of congested demand peaks. Arnott et al. [1] summarise a num-
ber of these. The central point of the model is the description of the congestion
cost as an externality related to the scheduling decisions of users and in particular
that, in aggregate and in equilibrium, the cost associated to scheduling is as large
as the average cost associated to the time spent queueing. This paper extends
these insights to queues subject to random sorting, considering users with general
concave utility of duration in the queue as well as of earliness/lateness.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the general framework
and then introduces the no residual queue (NRQ) property for a queue with a gen-
eral random sorting mechanism. The NRQ property holds when the queue has
exactly vanished at the time of the last arrival. We show that the NRQ property is
sufcient to establish a number of useful results. In particular, we derive the equi-
librium utility and the marginal utility of adding users under Nash equilibrium.
Remarkably, these results are not affected by the random sorting mechanism, pro-
vided the NRQ property holds. Thus, the NRQ property is extremely useful in the
analysis of congested demand peaks.2
The remainder of the paper is devoted to establishing the NRQ property under
various degrees of random queue sorting. First, Section 3 reviews and generalises
the standard case of strict queue priority and establishes that the NRQ property
holds here. Next, Section 4 considers the polar case of no queue priority (users to
be served are chosen completely at random from the queue). We establish also the
NRQ property for this case. It turns out that in order for the NRQ property to hold
in general, it is necessary to assume that the marginal disutility of being late is
always less than the marginal disutility of duration in the queue. This means that
users must be always willing to arrive one minute later in exchange for spending
one minute less in the queue.
Section 5 considers the intermediate case, which we refer to as loose queue
priority. Under this regime, the probability of being served at time t, conditional
2The NRQ property does not hold if the ratio of demand to capacity is stochastic [2]. We are
thus restricting attention to cases where the ratio of demand to capacity can be regarded as xed.
3
on being in the queue at time t, increases with the time spent in the queue. We
show that the above condition on marginal utilities is sufcient to guarantee the
NRQ property to hold in general when queue priority is loose. Some concluding
remarks are provided in Section 6.
2 Model specication
2.1 Evolution of the queue
ConsiderN users treated as a continuum. They must all pass through a bottleneck
which has a capacity of  users per time unit. Users arrive at the bottleneck
at the back of the queue at the locally bounded time dependent rate  (a)  0
during the interval [t0; t1]; where t0 and t1 are the minimum and the maximum of
the support of : The cumulative arrival rate up to time a is denoted by R (a) =R a
t0
 (s) ds; and R () is continuous since  () is locally bounded. Furthermore,
R () is differentiable at all points of continuity of  () : Users enter a vertical
queue of length Q (a) at time a; which represents the number of users who have
arrived at the entrance of the bottleneck but not yet exited. The queue length
evolves according to3
Q (a) = R (a) 
Z a
t0

 1fQ(s)>0g +min ( ;  (s)) 1fQ(s)=0g

ds; (1)
so Q () is continuous and also differentiable at points of continuity of  () : De-
note the minimum and the maximum of the support of the queue length Q () as
 0 and  1:
The last user exits the queue at time  1. This implies that  1  t1: If Q (t1) =
0; then  1 = t1: If Q (t1) > 0; we say that there is a residual queue at time t1:
In this case,  1 is given by Q (t1) =  ( 1   t1) ; since the queue length at time
t 2 [t1;  1[ is strictly positive if Q (t1) > 0.
2.2 Queue discipline
We shall consider various queue discipline regimes, i.e. ways of determining
which user exits the queue at each instant. At one extreme we have the strict
queue priority case, which was considered in the Vickrey [19] bottleneck model.
Here the queue obeys the rst-in-rst-out principle (FIFO) and users exit strictly
in the sequence in which they arrive. At the other extreme we have the no queue
priority case, where the user to exit at each instant is chosen completely at random
3Denote by 1fg the indicator function for the event in curly brackets.
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from the queue. Therefore, the probability of a user to exit from the queue does
not depend on how much time he has spent in the queue. It is the same for all
users present in the queue. In between these two cases, we have the loose queue
priority case. In this case, users who are in the queue in a given instant have a
higher probability of exit if they have spent more time in the queue.
We formalise these cases below through the conditional density of exit times
f (tja) ; which describes the probability of exit at time t conditional on arrival at
time a  t: This conditional density depends on the arrival rate  (), but it is
exogenous from the perspective of a single atomistic user. In all cases, except
the strict queue priority case that is treated separately, we assume that f (tja) is
differentiable as a function of a:
2.3 User preferences
A user arrives at the bottleneck at time a and exits at time t with a  t; such that
his duration in the queue is d = t a: The arrival time is chosen by the user while
the exit time is determined by the queue. He has a preferred exit time t: Utility is
associated with the duration in the queue and the deviation t  t of the exit time
from the preferred exit time. Write his utility as u (d; t  t). We take utility to be
concave, to have a unique maximum at d = 0 for any t  t and to have a unique
maximum at t = t for any duration in the queue. Given any exit time, users
strictly prefer zero duration in the queue to anything else, and given any duration
in the queue, users strictly prefer exiting at the preferred time to anything else.
With these assumptions, utility is strictly decreasing in d; strictly increasing in t
for t < t and strictly decreasing in t for t > t:
We consider users with identical t and take t = 0 at no loss of generality.
Users choose their arrival time a to maximise their expected utility given by
E (uja) =
Z 1
a
u (t  a; t) f (tja) dt: (2)
We specify the following assumptions concerning the utility function. De-
note the partial derivatives of u with respect to duration and exit time as u1 and
u2; respectively. We require rst and second derivatives to exist, except u2 (d; 0)
which is not required to exist. Clearly, users who exit late are always willing to
exit one minute earlier in exchange for spending one minute less in the queue. We
require that also users who exit early are always willing willing to exit one minute
earlier in exchange for spending one minute less in the queue. This rst condition
is assumed throughout the paper.
Condition 1 u1 (d; t) + u2 (d; t) < 0 for all t < 0:
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We shall also have use for a second condition stating that users who exit late
are always willing to exit one minute later in exchange for spending one minute
less in the queue. Clearly, users who exit early always satisfy this condition. This
second condition is assumed where indicated.
Condition 2 u1 (d; t) < u2 (d; t) for all t > 0:
We shall refer to the special case of linear utility. This will be important for
results and also helps in facilitating interpretation of results. The linear utility
formulation is4
u (d; t) =  d  t    t+;
where the parameters ;  and  are strictly positive. For the linear case, Con-
dition 1 states that  < ; while Condition 2 states that  < : Yoshida [20]
summarises empirical evidence and concludes that both cases  <  and  > 
are empirically relevant.
2.4 Nash equilibrium
We consider Nash equilibrium in pure strategies as the benchmark for rational
behavior.5 The Nash equilibrium is dened by the requirement that, conditional
on the actions of other users, no user has incentive to change his own action. With
identical users, this requirement turns into the condition that the expected utility
is constant and maximal over the times at which users arrive, i.e. over the support
of .
In the strict queue priority case, the exit time is given deterministically as a
function of the arrival time. We then require that utility is constant over all arrival
times a with  (a) > 0:
In all other cases considered, exit time is random. The Nash condition implies
that the expected utility is constant, i.e. @E(uja)
@a
= 0, for all a such that  (a) > 0,
i.e.,
 u (0; a) f (aja) +
Z 1
a

u (t  a; t) @f (tja)
@a
  u1 (t  a; t) f (tja)

dt = 0:
Recall that t0 and t1 are the times of the rst and the last arrival. The following
Lemma provides some properties of the Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The support of Q is a nite interval in Nash equilibrium, with  1 <
t0 =  0 < 0 and 0 < t1   1 <1:
4The function x+ equalsmax (x; 0), x  = ( x)+, so x = x+   x :
5The equilibrium concept is discussed by Arnott et al. [1].
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Proof. All N users can arrive and be served without queueing during an interval
of length N= ; so  1 <  N=   0;  1  N= < 1: There must be arrivals
before the queue can start, so t0   0: If t0 <  0, some users can benet from
postponing arrival so t0 =  0 in equilibrium. Similarly, t1   1; since otherwise
some users could benet from arriving earlier. In equilibrium, there is always
queue during ] 0;  1[ since otherwise users could benet from moving into the
gap in the queue. The arrival rate is locally bounded so not all users can arrive at
time 0. The rst arrival time occurs strictly before the preferred exit time 0, since
otherwise it would be possible to arrive at time 0 and be served immediately.
Similarly, the last arrival time occurs strictly after time 0:
An implication of Lemma 1 is that  (t0) >  , since the queue begins at time
t0. The no residual queue property states that there is no queue at the time of
arrival of the last user.
Denition 1 The no residual queue (NRQ) property holds if  1  t1.
This is an important property as it ensures that t1 =  1 in Nash equilibrium
by Lemma 1. A main result of this paper is that the NRQ property holds in Nash
equilibrium under strict, loose and no queue priority. The NRQ property allows
us to further characterise the Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Consider Nash equilibrium in a queue where the Nash equilibrium
is such that the no residual queue property holds. Then the interval of arrival,
[t0; t1] with t0 < 0 < t1, is uniquely determined by t1 = t0 + N and u (0; t0) =
u

0; t0 +
N
 

. The expected utility of any user is u (0; t0) : The marginal change
in expected utility from additional users is
@E (uja)
@N
=
1
 
u2 (0; t0)u2 (0; t1)
u2 (0; t1)  u2 (0; t0) < 0; (3)
which decreases in the number of users.
Proof. The NRQ property implies that t1 =  1; which means that Q (t1) = 0:
Hence the durations in the queue are zero at times t0 and t1 so that u (0; t0) =
u (0; t1) : By Lemma 1, the queue lasts from t0 to t1 such that N =  (t1   t0) :
Consequently, t0 and t1 are unique due to concavity of u () and t0 < 0 < t1. By
the equilibrium condition, E (uja) = u (0; t0) for all a 2 [t0; t1]. Differentiating
N =  (t1   t0) leads to 1 =  
 
@t1
@N
  @t0
@N

. Differentiating u (0; t0) = u (0; t1)
leads to u2 (0; t0) @t0@N = u2 (0; t1)
@t1
@N
, so that
@t0
@N
=
1
 
u2 (0; t1)
u2 (0; t0)  u2 (0; t1) < 0:
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Then
@u (0; t0)
@N
=
1
 
u2 (0; t0)u2 (0; t1)
u2 (0; t0)  u2 (0; t1) < 0:
Straightforward computation establishes that when u () is concave, then the mar-
ginal utility decreases
@2u (0; t0)
@N2
=
1
 2
u2 (0; t0)
3 u22 (0; t1)  u2 (0; t1)3 u22 (0; t0)
(u2 (0; t0)  u2 (0; t1))3
 0;
with strict inequality when u () is strictly concave.
The preceding Proposition exhibits the central properties of the bottleneck
model. In particular, the expected utility of any user is known as a function of
the number of users. These results are independent of the queueing regime. The
following corollaries follow immediately.
Corollary 1 In the linear case, @E(uja)
@N
=   1
 

+
and @
2E(uja)
@N2
= 0:
Corollary 2 The expected utility and the marginal expected utility (3) in Nash
equilibrium in a queue with the no residual queue property are not affected by
random queue sorting.
Below we establish that the NRQ property holds under strict, loose and no
queue priority and hence that Proposition 1 applies in all these regimes.
3 Strict queue priority
This is the case considered by Vickrey [19] and Arnott et al. [1] in the context
of transportation and telecommunication. Here we consider a more general for-
mulation of user preferences than the one considered by these authors. Users exit
strictly in the order in which they arrive, hence exit time is a deterministic func-
tion of arrival time. A user arriving at time a is served at time a + q (a), where
q (a) = Q (a) = : We have q (a) = R(a)
 
  (a  t0), since there is always queue
during [t0; t1]: Therefore
q0 (a) =
 (a)
 
  1: (4)
The queue satises the no residual queue property, since if the last user arrives
at time t1 when Q (t1) > 0, then his exit time will be  1 > t1: This implies
that he could postpone arrival until  1 to obtain zero duration in the queue while
leaving the exit time unchanged, in contradiction of Nash equilibrium. Hence
t1 =  1 so that Proposition 1 applies and t1 = t0 + N= : By concavity of u;
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t0 is the unique solution to the equation u (0; t0) = u (0; t0 +N= ). The utility
function is given by u (q (a) ; a+ q (a)) :We omit below the arguments of u () to
economise on notation. The rst-order condition for Nash equilibrium is @u
@a
=
u1  q0 (a) + u2  [1 + q0 (a)] = 0, a 2 [t0; t1]. Using (4) leads to the equilibrium
arrival rate
 (a) =  
u1
u1 + u2
> 0; (5)
which is strictly positive on [t0; t1] by Condition 1. (Condition 2 is not necessary
here.)
By (5),  (a) >  exactly when u2 > 0;which occurs exactly when a+q (a) <
0: Thus the queue builds up until time ~a < 0 dened by ~a + q (~a) = 0; at which
time the queue begins to diminish.
The arrival rate is decreasing. To see this for a 6= ~a; differentiate the equilib-
rium condition twice to nd
(q0 (a) ; 1 + q0 (a))

u11 u12
u12 u22

(q0 (a) ; 1 + q0 (a))T + (u1 + u2) q00 (a) = 0:
The rst term here is negative since u () is concave, and hence the second term is
positive. Then q00 (a)  0 by Condition 1. Find from (4) that 0 (a) = = q00 (a) ;
such that 0 (a)  0: The utility function is not required to be differentiable at the
point (q (~a) ; ~a+ q (~a)) : For any small " > 0;we have u2 (q (~a+ ") ; ~a+ "+ q (~a+ ")) <
0 and 0 < u2 (q (~a  ") ; ~a  "+ q (~a  ")) ; while u1 (q (a) ; a+ q (a)) < 0:
Hence  () can only jump down at ~a: Such a jump occurs in the linear case, where
the arrival rate is (a) =  
  for a < ~a, and (a) =  

+
for a > ~a, which is
piecewise constant with a downward jump at ~a =  


+
N
 
:
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the queue under strict queue priority with
linear utility. The curve R (a) is the cumulative arrival rate, the kink occurs at
the time where users exit at time t = 0: The curve  (t  t0) represents the
cumulative number of exits from the queue. The curve q (a) shows the duration in
the queue for users entering the queue at time a. It is maximal for users who exit
at time t: The curve a+ q (a) indicates the exit time for users entering the queue
at time a:
4 No queue priority
With no queue priority, users to exit at any time are chosen at random from the
queue at the rate  , i.e., all users present in the queue at a given instant have the
same chance to exit. The next Section 4.1 formalises this notion and derives the
distribution of exit times after the time of the last arrival t1 assuming that there is
9
Timet*
a+q(a)
y(t-t0)
q(a)
R(a)
Figure 1: The evolution of the queue under strict queue priority with linear utility
a residual queue at time t1. Using this distribution, Section 4.2 establishes that the
no residual queue property necessarily holds in Nash equilibrium in the no queue
priority case, while Section 4.3 shows that the equilibrium arrival rate is positive.
Condition 2 is sufcient to guarantee these results for general risk averse users
consistent with our demand setting.
4.1 The hazard rate
We formulate the no queue priority assumption by means of the hazard rate using
concepts and results from duration analysis [13]. The hazard rate does not depend
on a as all users present in the queue at time t have the same probability to exit.
Dene the hazard rate of a user who is present in the queue at time t as
 (t) =
f (tja)
1  F (tja) =
 
Q (t)
; (6)
where f (tja) and F (tja) are respectively the density and cumulative distribution
of exit time t conditional on being in the queue at time a: The survivor function
1  F (tja) can be expressed in terms of the integrated hazard by
1  F (tja) = e 
R t
a (s)ds: (7)
The following Lemma collects some relationships between the hazard rate and the
corresponding conditional density and cumulative distribution function.
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Lemma 2 Let the hazard rate  and the corresponding f (tja) and F (tja) be as
dened above. Then the following relations hold.
f (aja) =  (a) (8)
@F (tja)
@a
=   (a)
 (t)
f (tja) (9)
@f (tja)
@a
=  (a) f (tja) (10)
Proof. The rst assertion follows from (6), since F (aja) = 0: Differentiate (7) to
nd that
@F (tja)
@a
=   (a) e 
R t
a (s)ds =   (a) (1  F (tja)) :
Then the second assertion follows by substitution from (6), while the third asser-
tion follows by differentiation with respect to t:
The following technical Lemma concerns the conditional density of exit times
when there is a residual queue after the last arrival. It states that when a pool of
users exit with equal probability at a constant rate during some interval, then the
exit time for each of them is uniformly distributed over this interval.
Lemma 3 Consider the no queue priority case. Let t1 be the time of the last
arrival and assume that Q (t1) > 0: Then the exit time conditional on being in the
queue at time a (t1  a   1) is uniformly distributed over the interval [a;  1]
with f (tja) =  (a) ; t 2 [a;  1]. Furthermore, 0 (a) = 2 (a).
Proof. Evaluate rst 1  F (tja). Let t1  a  t   1: Then by (7)
1  F (tja) = exp

 
Z t
a
 
Q (t1)   (s  t1)ds

;
where we use that Q (s) = Q (t1)    (s  t1) : Make the substitution x =
Q (t1) =   (s  t1) to nd that
1  F (tja) = exp
 Z Q(t1)=  (t t1)
Q(t1)=  (a t1)
1
x
dx
!
=
Q (t1) =   (t  t1)
Q (t1) =   (a  t1) =
 (a)
 (t)
:
Use (6) to see that f (tja) =  (a) : As the density of exit times conditional on a
is constant, the exit time is uniformly distributed. To verify the last statement of
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the Proposition, simply differentiate
@ (a)
@a
=   Q
0 (a)
Q2 (a)
=
 2
Q2 (a)
= 2 (a) :
4.2 The no residual queue property
We shall now show that concave utility as dened above together with Condition
2 is sufcient to establish the no residual queue property for the no queue priority
case. Condition 2 ensures that the marginal disutility of lateness is smaller than
the marginal disutility of duration in the queue, so that users will always prefer
arriving one minute later to staying one minute longer in the queue. If the queue
diminishes quickly enough as arrival time increases, users will then postpone ar-
rival until the queue is no longer decreasing so quickly.
Proposition 2 Condition 2 is sufcient for the no residual queue property to hold.
Under linear utility, Condition 2 is also necessary.
Proof. Assume a Nash equilibrium with a residual queue at time a  t1: We
consider a > t1 and note that the result for a = t1 follows by taking limits. The
expected utility at time a; given by (2), is
E (uja) =  (a)
Z 1
a
u (t  a; t) dt
by Lemma 3. Using the last statement of Lemma 3, the derivative with respect to
the arrival time a is seen to be
1
 (a)
@E (uja)
@a
= E (uja)  u (0; a) 
Z 1
a
u1 (t  a; t) dt: (11)
Considering the following identity
u ( 1   a;  1)  u (0; a) =
Z 1
a
[u1 (t  a; t) + u2 (t  a; t)] dt;
we may write
1
 (a)
@E (uja)
@a
= E (uja)  u ( 1   a;  1) +
Z 1
a
u2 (t  a; t) dt:
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Add the two expressions for @E(uja)
@a
to obtain
1
 (a)
@E (uja)
@a
=

E (uja)  1
2
(u (0; a) + u ( 1   a;  1))

+
1
2
Z 1
a
[u2 (t  a; t)  u1 (t  a; t)] dt
The rst term on the RHS is positive by Jensen's inequality since u (t  a; t) is
concave as a function of t and the second term is strictly positive by Condition 2:
Thus, E (uja) is strictly increasing on ]t1;  1[ so that
E (ujt1) < E (uj 1) = u (0;  1) ; (12)
which contradicts Nash equilibrium.
To verify the second assertion of the Proposition, note that in the linear case,
1
 (a)
@E (uja)
@a
=
1
2
Z 1
a
[u2 (t  a; t)  u1 (t  a; t)] dt
=
1
2
( 1   a) (  ) :
Then @E(uja)
@a
> 0 is equivalent to Condition 2 and so Condition 2 is also necessary.
Note that we have not ruled out the existence of Nash equilibrium when Con-
dition 2 does not hold, but in that case the NRQ property does not hold in general.
Evidence concerning preferences for the scheduling of commuting trips seems to
indicate  <  in that case [16].
4.3 The equilibrium arrival rate
This section investigates the equilibrium arrival rate under no queue priority. Propo-
sition 3 establishes that the equilibrium arrival rate is always positive under Con-
dition 2.
Proposition 3 Condition 2 is sufcient for the equilibrium arrival rate to be strictly
positive over the interval [t0; t1] dened by u (0; t0) = u (0; t1). Under linear util-
ity, Condition 2 is also necessary.
Proof. The expression for the expected utility conditional on arrival at time a is
(2). Using (10), we express the equilibrium condition for the no queue priority
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case as follows.
@E (uja)
@a
=  (a)E (uja)  u (0; a) (a)  E (u1ja) = 0;
which can be solved using  (a) =  =Q (a) to yield
Q (a)
 
=
E (uja)  u (0; a)
E (u1ja) :
Differentiate again and use that (1) gives Q0 (a) =  (a)   to nd
 (a)
 
= 1  u2 (0; a)
E (u1ja)  
@E(u1ja)
@a
 (a)E (u1ja) : (13)
Multiply all terms in (13) by   (a)E (u1ja) > 0 to nd that  (a) > 0 iff
  (a)E (u1ja) +  (a)u2 (0; a) + @E (u1ja)
@a
> 0: (14)
Carry out the differentiation using Lemma 2 to nd that
@E (u1ja)
@a
=   (a)u1 (0; a)  E (u11ja) +  (a)E (u1ja) :
Insert this into the inequality (14) to nd that it is equivalent to
 (a) [u2 (0; a)  u1 (0; a)]  E (u11ja) > 0: (15)
The second term is positive since u is concave: Therefore Condition 2 implies that
 (a) > 0.
When utility is linear, (13) shows that the equilibrium arrival rate is
(a) =

 +

; a < 0
  

; a > 0:
Then  (a) > 0 implies Condition 2.
Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the queue under no queue priority and
linear utility. For comparison, the gure also shows the evolution of the queue
under strict queue priority. The kinked curves are the cumulative arrival rates.
Note that in the NQP case, the kink in the cumulative arrival rate occurs at time
t = 0: The straight curve represents the cumulative number of exits from the
queue.
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Figure 2: The evolution of the queue under strict queue priority with linear utility
5 Loose queue priority
This section concerns the case of loose queue priority, which we shall dene as
an intermediate case between the cases examined so far of strict and no queue
priority. We shall show that Condition 2 is sufcient to establish the no residual
queue property for the case of loose queue priority; hence Condition 2 implies
that Proposition 1 holds.
5.1 Motivation and illustration
Under strict queue priority, users exit strictly in the order in which they arrive.
Under no queue priority, users present in the queue at any instant all have the
same probability of exit. The intermediate case of loose queue priority is dened
by requiring that at any instant, users whose present duration in the queue is longer
have a higher chance to exit than users whose present duration in the queue is
shorter. So arrival time matters, even if queue priority is not strict. There are very
many possibilities for explicitly dening processes that have this property. The
example below provides a simple way to model loose priority.
Example 1 Introduce a variable N (a; t) denoting the number of users in the
queue at time t who arrived at the queue after time a; a  t. We have N (a; t) 
Q (t) : Furthermore, N (t; t) = 0 and N (t0; t) = Q (t) : At time t, there are
Q (t)   N (a; t) users in the queue who arrived earlier than a. Users exit the
queue at the rate  ; but under loose queue priority the hazard is not the same for
everybody, it depends on the time of arrival a. We want the hazard rate, denoted
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 (tja) ; to increase with the duration of the stay in the queue. One possible way
of achieving this is by specifying the hazard rate to be
 (tja) = H

N (a; t)
Q (t)

 
Q (t)
;
where H () is an increasing density on the unit interval with H (0) < 1. This
hazard rate increases with the duration in the queue. The denition encom-
passes strict and no queue priority as limiting cases as H () approaches ei-
ther a point mass at 1 or a uniform density. The hazard for the last user has
 (tjt1) = H

N(t1;t)
Q(t)

 
Q(t)
= H (0)  
Q(t)
<  
Q(t)
(t1  t) :
5.2 The no residual queue property
Recall that t1 is the time of the last arrival to the queue, while  1 = t1+Q (t1) = 
is the time of the last exit from the queue. When there is a residual queue at time
t1; Q (t1) > 0; so that  1 > t1:
In the case of no queue priority we noted in Proposition 2 that Condition 2
implies that Q (t1) > 0 ) E (uj 1) > E (ujt1) ; contradicting that we can have
Q (t1) > 0 in Nash equilibrium. In this case the distribution of exit times condi-
tional on entry at time t1 is the uniform distribution over the interval [t1;  1]: We
denoted this by F (tjt1) :
In the case of strict queue priority we noted that Q (t1) > 0 ) u ( 1) >
u (t1) ; which again contradicts that we can have Q (t1) > 0 in Nash equilibrium.
This happens because the last user entering at time t1 will exit at time  1 with
probability 1.
In order to establish the no residual queue property for the case of loose prior-
ity, it is sufcient to specify the distribution of exit times conditional on entry at
time t1: Denote this distribution by ~F (jt1) :We require that loose queue priority
satises the following condition.
Condition 3 Under loose queue priority, the distribution of exit times conditional
on arriving last, ~F (jt1), rst-order stochastically dominatesF (jt1) ;whereF (jt1)
is the uniform distribution over [t1;  1] with  1 = t1 +Q (t1) = :
This condition implies that the last user to arrive is worse off under loose queue
priority than under no queue priority (the utility function is decreasing in exit time,
for any given arrival time). He will be better off under any loose queue priority
than under strict queue priority, since under the latter priority, he will arrive at  1
with certainty.
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Proposition 4 Under loose queue priority, Condition 2 implies the no residual
queue property in Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that Q (t1) > 0. Then E ~F (ujt1)  EF (ujt1), due to rst-order
stochastic dominance. But EF (ujt1) < u (0;  1) by (12) in the proof of Propo-
sition 2. Then E ~F (ujt1) < u (0;  1) and the last user would prefer to arrive at
 1 rather than at t1: This contradicts Nash equilibrium. Hence we must have
Q (t1) = 0 in Nash equilibrium.
Hence Condition 2 is sufcient to ensure that Proposition 1 applies, also in the
case of loose queue priority.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper considers congestion in a bottleneck where the arrival rate is endoge-
nous and user preferences are dened over the duration in the queue as well as
the time of exit from the queue. The queue may be subject to varying degrees of
random sorting, ranging from a deterministic FIFO queue to a pure random queue.
The no residual queue property holds when the queue has vanished at the time of
the last arrival. Proposition 1 shows that the no residual queue property implies
that the interval of arrival as well as the expected utility of users are uniquely de-
termined in Nash equilibrium. Importantly, the interval of arrival as well as the
expected utility of users are both independent of the queueing regime. The equi-
librium expected utility is decreasing and concave as a function of the number of
users, such that there is a congestion externality which increases in the number of
users.
The remainder of the paper then establishes that Condition 2, restricting the
relation between the marginal utilities of duration and exit time, is sufcient for
the no residual queue property to hold in Nash equilibrium under all queueing
regimes considered and that this condition cannot be relaxed in general. The paper
leaves open the characterisation of Nash equilibrium when the no residual queue
property does not hold. Whether or not the no residual queue property holds is
jointly determined by the curvature of utility, the degree of random queue sorting
and the degree to which Condition 2 is violated.
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